North Dakota Supreme Court Review by North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 92 Number 2 Article 6 
1-1-2017 
North Dakota Supreme Court Review 
North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors (2017) "North Dakota Supreme Court Review," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 92 : No. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol92/iss2/6 
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu. 
          
 
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 
 
The North Dakota Supreme Court Review summarizes important 
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The purpose of the 
Review is to indicate cases of first impression, cases of significantly altered 
earlier interpretations of North Dakota law, and other cases of interest.  As a 
special project, Associate Editors assist in researching and writing the 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – FOURTH AMENDMENT – SEARCHES 
AND MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS 
State v. Schmidt 
 
In State v. Schmidt,1 Deven Schmidt (“Schmidt”) appealed from district 
court orders deferring imposition of sentence after he conditionally pled 
guilty to possession of drug paraphernalia and conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance.2  On appeal, Schmidt argued that the district court 
erred in denying his motions to suppress evidence that was obtained in 
violation of his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.3  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, “concluding the district court 
properly denied Schmidt’s motion to suppress evidence.”4 
In March 2014, a law enforcement officer served a bench warrant on 
Schmidt’s roommate, Devin Lavallie (“Lavallie”).5  Schmidt answered the 
door, informed the officer that Lavallie was sleeping, and let the officer 
enter the residence.6  The officer executed the bench warrant on Lavallie 
and subsequently arrested him.7  During the arrest, the officer observed 
drug paraphernalia in Lavallie’s room.8  Lavallie was handcuffed and 
placed in the living room while the officer handcuffed Schmidt.9  The 
officer testified that Schmidt was detained for safety purposes and for 
further investigation.10  The officer observed paraphernalia in the living 
room,11 and then obtained consent from Schmidt and Lavallie to search the 
rest of the residence where the officers found paraphernalia in Schmidt’s 
bedroom.12 
Schmidt was charged with possession of drug paraphernalia.13  He 
moved to suppress the evidence, alleging the officer did not have authority 
or consent to enter the residence to execute the bench warrant on Lavallie.14  
The district court suppressed evidence obtained from the search, and the 
 
1.  2016 ND 187, 885 N.W.2d 65. 
2.  Schmidt, ¶ 1, 885 N.W.2d at 68. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  Id. ¶ 2. 
6.  Id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Schmidt, ¶ 2, 885 N.W.2d at 68. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
12.  Id. ¶ 3. 
13.  Id. ¶ 4. 
14.  Schmidt, ¶ 4, 885 N.W.2d at 68. 
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State appealed.15  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district 
court’s suppression order in State v. Schmidt,16 finding that the officer had 
legal authority to execute the bench warrant on Lavallie.17  The Court then 
remanded the case.18  On remand, Schmidt moved to suppress evidence on 
grounds that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights.19  Schmidt 
based this argument on the facts that the officer opened his bedroom door, 
removed him from his room and that he was coerced into consenting an 
additional search.20  The district court denied Schmidt’s motion to 
suppress.21  Schmidt entered conditional guilty pleas.22  Subsequently, 
Schmidt appealed from both orders deferring imposition of sentence.23 
On appeal, Schmidt argued that his Fourth Amendment24 rights had 
been violated.25  Specifically, he argued that he was illegally detained.26  
The standard of review for a district court’s determination on a motion to 
suppress is well settled: 
When reviewing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress 
evidence, this Court defers to a trial court’s findings of fact, and 
conflicts in testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance because 
we recognize the trial court is in a superior position to assess the 
credibility of witnesses and weigh evidence.  “A district court’s 
findings of fact on a motion to suppress will not be reversed if 
there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting 
the court’s findings, and the decision is not contrary to the 
manifest weight of the evidence.”  “Questions of law are fully 
reviewable on appeal, and whether a finding of fact meets a legal 
standard is a question of law.”27 
Schmidt further argued that the officer should have left the residence 
after locating Lavallie.28  The district court rejected that argument finding 
 
15.  Id. 
16.  2015 ND 134, ¶ 11, 864 N.W.2d 265 [hereinafter Schmidt I]. 
17.  Schmidt, ¶ 5, 885 N.W.2d at 68. 
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. ¶ 6. 
20.  Id. 
21.  Id. 
22.  Id. 
23.  Schmidt, ¶ 6, 885 N.W.2d at 68. 
24.  The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the 
North Dakota Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
25.  Schmidt, ¶ 9, 885 N.W.2d at 69. 
26.  Id. 
27.  Id. ¶ 7 (citing to Schmidt I (citation omitted)). 
28.  Id. ¶ 11. 
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that he “was detained and handcuffed for officer safety after evidence of 
illegal activity was discovered.”29  Moreover, law enforcement officers 
may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, detain an 
individual for investigative purposes when there is no probable cause to 
make an arrest if a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists that criminal 
activity is afoot.30  Additionally, in Michigan v. Summers,31 the United 
States Supreme Court held that officers executing a search warrant have 
authority to “detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is 
conducted.”32 
In affirming the district court’s decision, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances, the search 
and detention of Schmidt was reasonable.33  The detention was based on 
evidence found in plain view, the officers had reason to believe Schmidt 
was a resident of the home, intrusion into his room was minimal, and while 
in the residence, the officer formed reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity.34  Furthermore, suppression was not warranted because Schmidt 
gave consent to the search.35 
Schmidt then argued that his consent was not voluntarily made.36  
Warrantless searches inside a person’s residence are presumptively 
unreasonable, unless it falls under an exception to the warrant 
requirement.37  Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement.38  “A 
district court must ‘determine whether the consent was voluntary under the 
totality of the circumstances.’”39  The factors the North Dakota Supreme 
Court considered in determining whether Schmidt’s consent was voluntary 
were as follows: 
(1) the characteristics and condition of the accused at the time of 
the consent, including age, sex, race, education level, physical or 
mental condition, and prior experience with police; and (2) the 
details of the setting in which the consent was obtained, including 
the duration and conditions of detention, police attitude toward the 
 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id. at 70 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968)). 
31.  452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981). 
32.  Schmidt, ¶ 15, 885 N.W.2d at 72 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 
(1981)). 
33.  Id. ¶ 19, 885 N.W.2d at 73. 
34.  Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 885 N.W.2d at 72-73. 
35.  Id. ¶ 20, 855 N.W.2d at 73. 
36.  Id. ¶ 21, 855 N.W.2d at 73-73. 
37.  Id. ¶ 15, 885 N.W.2d at 72. 
38.  Schmidt, ¶ 23, 855 N.W.2d at 74. 
39.  Id. (citing State v. Hayes, 2012 ND 9, ¶ 38, 809 N.W.2d 309, 313). 
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defendant, and the diverse pressures that sap the accused’s powers 
of resistance or self control.40 
Schmidt admitted that he signed the consent form; however, that alone 
is not enough to determine voluntariness of the consent.41  The Court also 
looked at Schmidt’s behavior, characteristics, and condition.  The Court 
recognized that he was stressed, nervous, calm, not combative and 
cooperated with law enforcement.42  Although Schmidt was detained and 
not free to leave, the court concluded that his content was not coerced.43  
The Court found that the officers made legal entry into the residence, they 
observed paraphernalia in plain view which gave rise to reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, the officer legally arrested both 
Lavallie and Schmidt, and no search of the home was conducted prior to 
obtaining consent.44  “Given [the court’s] deferential standard of review of 
a district court’s finding of voluntary consent, based on the totality of the 
circumstances, [the Court] conclude[s] sufficient competent evidence 
supports the district court’s finding, and its finding is not contrary to the 

















40.  Id. ¶ 24 (quoting State v. Haibeck, 2004 ND 163, ¶ 21, 685 N.W.2d 512, 519). 
41.  Id. ¶ 25. 
42.  Id. ¶ 26. 
43.  Id. ¶ 27, 855 N.W.2d at 75. 
44.  Schmidt, ¶ 27, 855 N.W.2d at 75. 
45.  Id. ¶ 32, 855 N.W.2d at 76. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—JUDGMENT—APPEAL AND ERROR—
ZONING AND PLANNING 
Ferguson v. City of Fargo 
 
Ferguson v. City of Fargo involved owners of unplatted property 
adjacent to a river bringing a declaratory judgment action against the city, 
seeking declaration that an ordinance relating to construction on property 
located near rivers violated equal protection because it treated platted and 
unplatted property differently.46  The district court declared the ordinance 
unconstitutional as it applied to the owners, Edward and Lavonna Ferguson 
(“Fergusons”), and others similarly situated.47  The City of Fargo (“Fargo”) 
appealed.48  The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
ordinance did not violate equal protection.49 
In May 2012, after historic flooding, Fargo enacted Ordinance 4818 
(the “Ordinance”).50  The Ordinance prohibited construction within certain 
setback areas of the Red, Wild Rice, and Sheyenne Rivers.51  Fargo’s stated 
primary purpose in enacting the ordinance was to limit or prevent new 
construction within setback areas near river banks and drains to protect 
citizens, private property, and city infrastructure from Red River Valley 
floodwaters.52 
With respect to the ordinance’s exceptions to the prohibition on 
construction, it created a distinction between platted property (property that 
has been subdivide into blocks and lots) and unplatted property (property 
that has not been subdivided).53  Under the ordinance, owners of vacant 
property platted before the ordinance’s effective date could apply for a 
waiver from the construction prohibition.54  Owners of unplatted property 
could not apply for a waiver.55 
The Fergusons owned approximately six acres of unplatted property 
adjacent to the Sheyenne River that is partially within the ordinance’s 
setback areas.56  After the ordinance went into effect, the Fergusons 
 
46.  2016 ND 194, 886 N.W.2d 557. 
47.  Id. ¶ 5, 886 N.W.2d at 558. 
48.  Id. ¶ 1. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Id. ¶ 2. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Ferguson, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 558. 
53.  Id. ¶ 3, 886 N.W.2d at 558-59. 
54.  Id. at 559. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. ¶ 4. 
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requested a waiver seeking to develop their property into multiple single-
family duplexes.57  Fargo denied the request because the property was not 
platted.58 
The Fergusons brought a declaratory judgment action against Fargo.59  
The Fergusons asked the district court to declare that the ordinance violated 
the equal protection clauses of the North Dakota Constitution and the 
United States Constitution because it treated platted and unplatted property 
differently.60  Fargo argued that its distinction between platted and 
unplatted property was rationally related to a legitimate government interest 
in limiting new construction on property subject to flooding, and was 
therefore, not in violation of the equal protection clauses.61 
The district court found in favor of the Fergusons.62  It found that the 
ordinance treated platted and unplatted property differently.63  The court 
noted that “[p]latting does not change the character of the land at issue” and 
“[w]hether land is platted or unplatted does not make it more or less likely 
to be subject to slumping or flooding.”64  The court concluded that the 
ordinance’s distinction between platted and unplatted property was not 
rationally related to Fargo’s interest in preventing new construction on river 
bank lands subject to soil instability or flooding and the management of 
waiver requests.65  The court declared the ordinance unconstitutional as 
applied to the Fergusons and others similarly situated.66  Fargo appealed the 
judgment declaring the ordinance unconstitutional.67 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed.68  The Court explained that 
“[t]he equal protection clause does not forbid classifications, but prevents 
‘government decision-makers from treating differently persons who are in 
all relevant respects alike.’”69  Agreeing with Fargo, the Court held that the 
ordinance, in making a distinction between platted and unplatted property, 
did not violate equal protection because it was rationally related to the 
 
57.  Id. 
58.  Ferguson, ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 559. 
59.  Id. ¶ 5. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Ferguson, ¶ 5, 886 N.W.2d at 559. 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 558. 
68.  Id. ¶ 16, 886 N.W.2d at 563. 
69.  Id. ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 560 (quoting Hamich, Inc. v. State ex rel. Clayburgh, 1997 ND 
110, ¶ 31, 564 N.W.2d 640, 647). 
           
500 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:493 
legitimate government interest of limiting new construction on property 
subject to flooding.70  The Court noted Fargo had distinguished platted from 
unplatted property near rivers because there were a finite number of vacant 
platted properties, and developers and owners had shown an intent to build 
in the future by completing platting process or purchasing platted 
property.71 
Justice Crothers dissented from the majority, arguing that denial of a 
right on the sole basis that the land was not platted before May 2012, 
stripped away property owners’ ability to ever request a waiver from the 
building restrictions.72  Their property is “frozen in time. But platted 
property is not.”73  As differing treatment is based solely on whether the 
land was platted in 2012, the Court must consider whether platting land 
before May 2012 advances the governmental interests.74  Justice Crothers 
argued it did not.75  “While the owner/developer’s investment of time and 
money may correlate to Fargo’s potential liability for halting all 
development of platted land,” it provided “no rational basis for permitting 
waivers in platted land and preventing waivers in land that was unplatted in 


















70.  Ferguson, ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 558. 
71.  Id. ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 563. 
72.  Id. ¶ 20, 886 N.W.2d at 564 (Crothers, J., dissenting). 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. ¶ 21. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Ferguson, ¶ 25, 886 N.W.2d at 564-65. 
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CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS—SERVICE OF 
PROCESS 
Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC 
 
In Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC, 
Goliath Energy Services, LLC, (“Goliath”) and George Satterfield 
(“Satterfield”) challenged district court orders denying their motions to 
vacate default judgments entered against them in favor of Monster Heavy 
Hauler, LLC, (“Monster”) and Rossco Crane and Rigging, Inc. 
(“Rossco”).77  The North Dakota Supreme Court held that (1) signed return 
receipts for service by certified mail raised a rebuttable presumption of 
valid service of process;78 and (2) unchallenged allegations in complaints 
were sufficient to provide basis for piercing the corporate veil.79 
The litigants in this case are in the business of oil field construction, 
trucking, and rigging.80  Goliath is a limited liability company with its 
principal place of business located in Grand Junction, Colorado.81  
Satterfield was Goliath’s president and Karl Troestler (“Troestler”) was its 
chief financial officer.82  Both Rossco, and later Monster, sued Goliath, 
Troestler, and Satterfield to collect payment of outstanding balances owed 
for services provided to Goliath.83  Rossco sought $95,243.80 plus interest, 
and Monster sought $226,431.35 plus interest.84 
Rossco commenced its action by service of its Summons and 
Complaint through certified mail in November 2014.85  Goliath, Satterfield, 
and Troestler were each served at three separate addresses, two in Grand 
Junction and one in Alexander, ND.86  The three return receipts from 
Alexander were signed by “Larry Adams” and “J. Leigh,” who marked the 
“Agent” boxes on the receipts.87  The six return receipts from the Grand 
Junction addresses were signed by “Sherry Bley,” who did not mark either 
 
77.  2016 ND 176, ¶ 1, 883 N.W.2d 917, 919. 
78.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 20, 883 N.W.2d at 926. 
79.  Id. ¶ 27, 883 N.W.2d at 928. 
80.  Id. ¶ 2, 883 N.W.2d at 919. 
81.  Id. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 2, 883 N.W.2d at 919. 
85.  Id. ¶ 3. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Id. 
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the “Agent” or “Addressee” boxes.88  The defendants did not file answer to 
Rossco’s Complaint.89 
Rossco filed a motion for default judgment on January 6, 2015.90  
Satterfield then phoned Rossco’s attorney on January 16, 2015, to request 
copies of Rossco’s Summons and Complaint and default judgment motion 
be emailed to him.91  Rossco’s attorney sent Satterfield a test email to 
confirm his email address, and Satterfield also requested the documents be 
emailed to a Colorado attorney.92  On January 20, 2015, Satterfield sent an 
email to Rossco’s attorney, the Colorado attorney, and the North Dakota 
attorney representing Goliath and Satterfield in these appeals stating he had 
talked to Rossco’s manager and “they have agreed to stand down and work 
with me.”93  On January 21, 2015, Rossco’s attorney emailed Satterfield 
and copied the Colorado and North Dakota attorneys informing Satterfield 
that the judge had signed the order for default judgment, but that Rossco’s 
attorney would not prepare a judgment at that time, due to negotiations 
between the parties.94 
Then, on January 29, 2015, Rossco’s attorney sent an email to 
Satterfield informing him that he also represented Monster and that Monster 
had filed a well and pipeline lien in Billings County, ND for a debt owed by 
Goliath.95  Satterfield asked Monster’s tell the North Dakota lawyer about 
that lien, but the North Dakota attorney told Monster’s attorney “[a]t this 
time you can communicate directly with Goliath. I will let you know if that 
changes.”96  On February 23, 2015, Satterfield emailed Monster’s attorney 
to ask if Monster’s position had changed after Satterfield spoke with 
Monster’s general manager.97  The negotiations between the parties 
ultimately failed.98 
Monster commenced its action by service of its Summons and 
Complaint through certified mail in March 2015.  Goliath, Satterfield, and 
Troestler were each served at the same address in Grand Junction.99  Two 
return receipts for Satterfield and Troestler were signed by “Sherry Bley,” 
 
88.  Id. 
89.  Id. 
90.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 4, 883 N.W.2d at 919. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 919-20. 
93.  Id. at 920. 
94.  Id. 
95.  Id. ¶ 5. 
96.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 5, 883 N.W.2d at 920. 
97.  Id. 
98.  Id. 
99.  Id. ¶ 6. 
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who indicated actual delivery occurred at a different Grand Junction 
address.100  Neither the “Agent” nor “Addressee” boxes were marked.  The 
defendants never filed answers to the Monster Complaint.101 
Monster obtained a judgment on June 9, 2015, for $240,107.23, 
because of the defendant’s failure to respond to Monster’s motion for 
default judgment.102  On July 29, 2015, Rossco advised its attorney that 
negotiations had also failed with the defendants.103  Default judgment was 
entered against the defendants in favor of Rossco for $97,233.04 on August 
3, 2015.104 
After Monster moved to compel answers to interrogatories in aid of 
judgment and execution, the North Dakota attorney filed a Notice of 
Appearance on behalf of Goliath and Satterfield.105  On November 23, 
2015, Goliath and Satterfield filed motions to vacate the default judgments 
obtained by both Monster and Rossco.106  Goliath and Satterfield argued 
that (1) service of process was insufficient, and (2) Monster and Rossco had 
failed to present adequate proof to pierce Goliath’s corporate veil and hold 
Satterfield personally liable for the debts of Goliath.107  The district court 
denied both motions on February 2, 2016, finding the service of Summons 
and Complaint were properly effectuated on the defendants and that the 
defendants failed to timely respond to the motions for default judgment.108  
The district court also found Goliath and Satterfield’s defense of 
insufficiency of process was effectively waived by the defendants deliberate 
failure to timely raise it.109  Goliath and Satterfield appealed the district 
court judgment to the North Dakota Supreme Court.110 
Goliath and Satterfield argued the district court erred in denying their 
motions to vacate the default judgments against them under North Dakota 
Rules of Civil Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 60(b).111  Goliath and Satterfield 
 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
102.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 7, 883 N.W.2d at 920. 
103.  Id. 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. ¶ 8. 
106.  Id. 
107.  Id. 
108.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 8, 883 N.W.2d at 920-21. 
109.  Id. at 921. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. ¶ 9; N.D. R. CIV. P. § 60(b) (2017) states in relevant part: 
“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with 
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were required to show the district court abused its discretion in entering the 
default judgments against them,112 which occurs when a court acts in an 
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner.113  To prove abuse of 
discretion, Goliath and Satterfield bore the burden of establishing sufficient 
grounds for disturbing the finality of the judgment.114  The Court also noted 
that Goliath’s and Satterfield’s own errors may not constitute proper 
grounds for relief from a default judgment.115  To rule a default as void or 
valid, a district court must have subject-matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction over the parties.116 
Goliath and Satterfield argued the default judgments against them were 
void for lack of personal jurisdiction, because Monster and Rossco did not 
prove the individuals who accepted service of the Summons and 
Complaints were authorized to do so on their behalf.117  Personal 
jurisdiction is acquired by service of process in compliance with N.D. R. 
CIV. P. 4.118  The Court noted that a sheriff’s return of service of process 
creates a rebuttable presumption that service was actually made, which 
shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the service was not properly 
effectuated.119  There is also a disputable presumption that a letter duly 
directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail.120  North 
Dakota statutory law is similar to the federal common law “mailbox 
 
reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); . . . or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” 
112.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 10, 883 N.W.2d at 921 (quoting Shull v. Walcker, 2009 ND 
142, ¶¶ 13-14, 770 N.W.2d 274, 279). 
113.  Id. (citing US Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Arnold, 2001 ND 130, ¶ 21, 631 N.W.2d 150, 155). 
114.  Id. (citing Follman v. Upper Valley Special Educ. Unit, 2000 ND 72, ¶ 10, 609 N.W.2d 
90, 93). 
115.  Id. (citing Beaudoin v. South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, 2005 ND 120, ¶ 40, 699 
N.W.2d 421, 435-36). 
116.  Id. ¶ 11, 883 N.W.2d at 921-22 (citing Alliance Pipeline L.P. v. Smith, 2013 ND 117, ¶ 
18, 833 N.W.2d 464, 471). 
117.  Id. ¶ 12, 883 N.W.2d at 922. 
118.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶¶ 13-14, 883 N.W.2d at 922-23; N.D. R. CIV. P. § 4 (2017) 
states in relevant part: 
“Service must be made on a domestic or foreign corporation or on a partnership or 
other unincorporated association, by: (i) delivering a copy of the summons to an 
officer, director, superintendent or managing or general agent, or partner, or associate, 
or to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on its 
behalf, or to one who acted as an agent for the defendant with respect to the matter on 
which the plaintiff’s claim is based and who was an agent of the defendant at the time 
of service . . . (iii) any form of mail or third-party commercial delivery addressed to 
any of the foregoing persons and requiring a signed receipt and resulting in delivery to 
that person.” 
119.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 14, 883 N.W.2d at 923 (citing Farm Credit Bank v. 
Stedman, 449 N.W.2d 562, 564 (N.D. 1989)). 
120.  Id. ¶ 15 (citing First Bank v. Neset, 1997 ND 4, ¶ 18, 559 N.W.2d 211, 214). 
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rule,”121 which provides that “the proper and timely mailing of a document 
raises a rebuttable presumption that the document has been received by the 
addressee in the usual time.”122  The Court noted that many jurisdictions 
have adopted rebuttable presumptions regarding certified mail for the 
purpose of service of process,123 and stated that “a rebuttable presumption 
of valid process arises when a return receipt for certified mail is signed, and 
that the signator, if not the addressee, will be presumed to have acted as the 
agent of the addressee authorized to accept service in the absence of proof 
to the contrary.”124 
The Court found that Goliath’s and Satterfield’s position that Monster 
and Rossco did not have personal jurisdiction over them was flawed for 
four reasons: (1) a sheriff’s return creates a rebuttable presumption that 
service was validly effected, and certified mail is also an authorized method 
for valid service;125 (2) “Larry Adams” and “J. Leigh” marked the “Agent” 
boxes in the receipts, giving them presumptive agency status;126 (3) the 
burden to prove that the signators were not authorized to accept service of 
process was on Goliath and Satterfield, and they did not meet that 
burden;127 and (4) Goliath and Satterfield had knowledge of both 
underlying collection actions, including the default judgment motions, and 
they had the burden of establishing sufficient grounds for disturbing the 
finality of the judgments under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b), which they failed to 
do.128 
As such, the Court reasoned the signed return receipts for certified mail 
raised a rebuttable presumption of valid service of process.129  Monster and 
Rossco presented evidence of valid service, and Goliath and Satterfield 
failed to present anything to rebut that evidence.130  Further, Goliath and 
Satterfield did not even claim the signators were unauthorized to accept 
service on their behalf.131  As such, the Court held the district court did not 
err in ruling service of process was sufficient and the court thus had 
 
121.  Schikore v. Bank America Supplemental Retirement Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
122.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 15, 883 N.W.2d at 923 (quoting Schikore, 269 F.3d at 961). 
123.  Id. ¶ 16, 883 N.W.2d at 923-24 (citing Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 
1134, 1137 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
124.  Id. ¶ 17, 883 N.W.2d at 924. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. at 925. 
128.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 18, 883 N.W.2d at 925. 
129.  Id. ¶ 19, 883 N.W.2d at 926. 
130.  Id. 
131.  Id. 
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personal jurisdiction over Goliath and Satterfield in the collection 
actions.132 
Satterfield next argued the district court erred in refusing to grant him 
relief from the default judgments because piercing the corporate veil 
requires “proof” before he could be found personally liable for the 
judgments.133  To determine whether the corporate veil should be pierced, 
the Court considers the factors laid out in Coughlin Constr. Co., Inc. v. Nu-
Tec Indus., Inc.,134 which include: 
insufficient capitalization for the purposes of the corporate 
undertaking, failure to observe corporate formalities, nonpayment 
of dividends, insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time of 
the transaction in question, siphoning of funds by the dominant 
shareholder, nonfunctioning of other officers and directors, 
absence of corporate records, and the existence of the corporation 
as merely a façade for individual dealings.135 
An element of injustice, inequity, or fundamental unfairness must also be 
present to properly pierce the corporate veil.136 
In their default judgments motions, Monster and Rossco submitted 
affidavits of proof in which they stated they had personal knowledge of the 
facts contained in their Complaints.  Among other things, the Complaints 
alleged “George Satterfield was President of Goliath . . . Karl Troestler was 
Chief Financial Officer of Goliath . . . [Goliath and Troestler] comingled 
corporation funds, failed to follow corporation formalities and was [sic] 
undercapitalized.”137  The Court reasoned those allegations constituted 
relevant factors for piercing the corporate veil and placed Satterfield and 
Troestler on notice that Monster and Rossco were seeking to pierce the 
corporate veil.  As such, the Court held that those allegations, sworn to by 
the plaintiffs and unchallenged by Satterfield, are sufficient to provide the 
basis for piercing the corporate veil in the default judgment proceedings.138  
The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
 
132.  Id. ¶ 20. 
133.  Id. ¶ 21. 
134.  2008 ND 163, ¶ 20, 755 N.W.2d 867. 
135.  Monster Heavy Haulers, ¶ 23, 883 N.W.2d at 926-27 (quoting Hilzendager v. Skwarok, 
335 N.W.2d 768, 774 (N.D. 1983)). 
136.  Id. ¶ 21, 883 N.W.2d at 927 (citing Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 564 (N.D. 
1985)). 
137.  Id. ¶ 25. 
138.  Id. ¶ 26. 
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CRIMINAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—ARREST 
State v. Adan 
 
State v. Adan, involved a continued detention of a vehicle during a 
traffic stop until a K-9 unit arrived.140  Defendants Abdullahi Ahmed Adan 
(“Adan”) and Semereab Haile Tesfaye (“Tesfaye”) each entered conditional 
guilty pleas in district court for possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to manufacture or deliver, following denial of their motions to 
suppress evidence gathered as a result of the continued detention.141  
Defendants appealed the denial of their motions to suppress evidence.142  
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the continued 
detention was supported by reasonable suspicion under the totality of the 
circumstances.143 
On the day of the arrest, Officer Steven Clark observed a car that 
appeared to weave in its lane and noticed that the vehicle was from out of 
state.144  Officer Clark turned around to follow it.145  From several car 
lengths behind, Officer Clark saw the driver reach into the backseat of the 
vehicle and appear to place something like a blanket over something in the 
backseat.146  Officer Clark pulled up next to the vehicle and observed the 
driver with his hands at ten and two on the wheel, staring intently forward, 
and a passenger who appeared to be sleeping.147  Officer Clark observed the 
driver moving the corner of his mouth, as if he were trying to hide his 
conversation with the passenger.148  However, not seeing any traffic 
infractions, Officer Clark stopped following the vehicle.149 
Officer Clark relayed his suspicions to Officer Steve Edwards, who 
then located the vehicle.150  Officer Edwards observed the vehicle speeding 
and following too close to the vehicle in front of it.151  Based on these 
traffic violations, Officer Edwards initiated a traffic stop,152 during which 
Officer Edwards observed a blanket covering about half of the backseat, an 
 
140.  2016 ND 215, 886 N.W.2d 841. 
141.  Id. ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 842-43. 
142.  Id. 
143.  Id. at 843. 
144.  Id. ¶ 2. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Adan, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 843. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id. ¶ 3. 
151.  Id. 
152.  Adan, ¶ 3, 886 N.W.2d at 843. 
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air freshener, a bottle of Ozone scent spray, eye drops, and an energy drink 
in the vehicle.153 
Adan, the driver, and Tesfaye, the passenger, both acted nervously.154  
When Officer Edwards questioned Adan and Tesfaye individually about 
their trip, they gave conflicting stories.155  Tesfaye was unable to recall the 
name of the passenger they had dropped off, even though they allegedly 
rode with him for a couple of days.156  A records check indicated that 
Tesfaye had recently been put on probation for possession of 
methamphetamine.157  After the traffic stop, Officer Edwards issued Adan a 
warning.158 Adan then agreed to answer a few more questions about their 
trip.159  Officer Edwards later asked for permission to search the vehicle and 
have a dog walk around it.160  Adan did not consent.161  Officer Edwards 
called dispatch to send a K-9 to his location.162  Forty-five minutes later, a 
K-9 arrived and signaled the presence of narcotics.163  A search of the 
vehicle revealed over two pounds of marijuana.164 
Whether the facts support a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion 
in the context of an investigative stop is a question of law, and thus, is fully 
reviewable by the North Dakota Supreme Court.165  When the original 
purpose of a traffic stop is complete, the officer must have a reasonable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to continue the detention.166  Any 
further detention, without reasonable suspicion, violates the traffic 
offender’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.167 
On appeal, Adan and Tesfaye argued that after they were given a 
written warning for their driving conduct, Officer Edwards lacked a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to continue to detain 
them.168  When deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court 
 
153.  Id. ¶ 4. 
154.  Id. ¶¶ 5-6. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. ¶ 6. 
157.  Id. ¶ 7. 
158.  Adan, ¶ 8, 886 N.W.2d at 844. 
159.  Id. 
160.  Id. 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. 
163.  Id. 
164.  Adan, ¶ 8, 886 N.W.2d at 844. 
165.  Id. ¶ 9 (citing State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 6, 662 N.W.2d 242, 245). 
166.  Id. ¶ 11. 
167.  Id. 
168.  Id. ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 845. 
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looks at the totality of the circumstances.169  Information obtained by one 
officer may be used by another to establish reasonable suspicion if the first 
officer conveyed the information to the second officer.170 
Tesfaye argued that innocent conduct, such as possession of eye drops, 
energy drinks, and driving a rental vehicle, cannot be used to establish 
reasonable suspicion.171  The Court disagreed, noting that while such 
conduct in isolation is not inherently suspicious, it looks at the totality of 
the circumstances to determine if reasonable suspicion exists.172  Therefore, 
considering the totality of the circumstances, including (1) Adan and 
Tesfaye both acting nervous, (2) they told Officer Edwards conflicting 
stories about the trip, (3) Tesfaye did not know the name of the passenger 
they dropped off, (4) the vehicle contained masking agents, eye drops, and 
an energy drink, (5) Tesfaye had recently been put on probation for 
possession of methamphetamine, and (6) the vehicle was a rental, the Court 
concluded there was reasonable suspicion that Adan and Tesfaye were 
engaged in criminal activity.173  Thus, their continued detention until a K–9 
unit arrived was lawful.174 
Justice McEvers concurred with the majority, and wrote separately, 
stating that while each individual item noted by law enforcement alone 
would not be sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, the amalgamation of 
the items does.175  She further stated that the dissent incorrectly applied the 
the totality of the circumstances test when it attempted to limit what factors 
could be considered.176 
Justice Crothers also concurred with the majority, and wrote separately, 
noting that while the totality of the circumstances provided reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, there remained a question as to whether the 
duration of the detention was reasonable.177  He was troubled by the 
defendants’ forty-five-minute detention and questioned whether that 
duration of seizure violates the Fourth Amendment.178 
 
169.  Id. ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 844. 
170.  Adan, ¶ 12, 866 N.W.2d at 844 (citing Ell v. Dir., Dep’t of Trans., 2016 ND 164, ¶ 10, 
883 N.W.2d 464, 468). 
171.  Id. ¶ 27, 866 N.W.2d at 847. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. 
174.  Id. 
175.  Id. ¶ 30 (McEvers, J., concurring). 
176.  Adan, ¶ 32, 866 N.W.2d at 848 (McEvers, J., concurring). 
177.  Id. ¶¶ 41-42 (Crothers, J., concurring). 
178.  Id. ¶¶ 43-45, 886 N.W.2d at 850-51. 
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Justice Kapsner dissented from the majority.179  She argued that a 
finding of reasonable suspicion should not be created “based upon piling up 
of innocuous facts.”180  She further stated that what Officer Edwards 
articulated as bases for his suspicion were not reasonable, such that the stop 

































179.  Id. ¶ 51, 886 N.W.2d at 852 (Kapsner, J., dissenting). 
180.  Id. ¶ 59, 886 N.W.2d at 853. 
181.  Id. ¶ 62, 886 N.W.2d at 854. 
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CRIMINAL LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—AUTOMOBILES—
ARREST 
State v. Patrick 
 
State v. Patrick involved a criminal defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence seized after a traffic stop.182  The district court granted defendant 
Alexander Patrick’s (“Patrick”) motion to suppress.183  The State appealed, 
and the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that 
the officer’s mistaken belief that the statute prohibited operating a vehicle 
with more than four illuminated front-facing lights was objectively 
reasonable, such that the stop of vehicle with six front-facing lights was 
supported by reasonable suspicion.184 
A police officer stopped Patrick’s vehicle after observing it had two 
head lamps and four fog lights that were noticeably brighter than others on 
the road.185  The officer initiated the stop on the mistaken belief that a 
statute prohibited operating a vehicle with more than four illuminated front-
facing lights.186  The officer testified he believed Patrick was in violation of 
the statute by having six front facing lights that were noticeably brighter 
than others on the road.187  The statute, North Dakota Century Code (“N.D. 
Cent. Code”) § 39-21-25(2), states: 
Whenever a motor vehicle equipped with headlamps . . . is also 
equipped with any [] other lamp[s] on the front thereof projecting a 
beam of intensity greater than three hundred candlepower, not 
more than a total of four of any such lamps on the front of a 
vehicle may be lighted. . . .188 
The stop led to a search of the vehicle, revealing drugs and a loaded 
handgun.189  Patrick moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the 
search.190  He argued that the traffic stop was invalid because the term 
“candlepower” in N.D. Cent. Code § 39-21-25(2) was unconstitutionally 
vague.191  The district court suppressed the evidence on the grounds that the 
 
182.  2016 ND 209, 886 N.W.2d 681. 
183.  Id. ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 682. 
184.  Id. ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684. 
185.  Id. ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 682. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. 
188.  Patrick, ¶ 3, 886 N.W.2d at 682 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-21-25(2) (2017)). 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. 
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statute the officer relied on was unconstitutionally vague.192  The State 
appealed.193 
Justice Crothers wrote for a unanimous Court.  The validity of the 
officer’s stop turned on whether reasonable suspicion existed at the time of 
the traffic stop to believe Patrick was in violation of the statute.194  The 
Court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion, and, as such, the stop 
was valid, and the evidence should not have been suppressed.195 
Where an officer makes a mistake of law, the “mistake may provide the 
reasonable suspicion justifying a traffic stop only when objectively 
reasonable. . . .”196  The Court found that the officer’s mistaken belief was 
objectively reasonable, giving the officer the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to justify the traffic stop.197  The statute prohibited lighting more 
than four additional front-facing lamps at one time when the beam of light 
is greater than 300 candlepower.198  The officer testified he believed Patrick 
was in violation of the statute by having six front-facing lights that were 
noticeably brighter than others on the road.199  This evidence, the Court 
reasoned, supported a reasonable suspicion to believe Patrick was in 
violation of the statute.200 
The district court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the statute 
the officer relied on was unconstitutionally vague.201  The Court held that 
this was improper.202  The validity of the stop did not turn on the 
constitutionality of the statute, but on whether reasonable suspicion existed 
at the time of the traffic stop to believe Patrick was in violation of the 
statute.203  As the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe Patrick was in 
violation of the statute, the stop was valid.204  Thus, the district court erred 
in suppressing evidence obtained as a result of the stop.205  Accordingly, the 
Court reversed the district court order suppressing evidence and remanded 
for further proceedings.206 
 
192.  Id. ¶ 4. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Patrick, ¶ 5, 886 N.W.2d at 682. 
195.  Id. ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684. 
196.  Id. ¶ 9 (quoting State v. Hirschkorn, 2016 ND 117, ¶ 14, 881 N.W.2d 244, 248-49). 
197.  Id. ¶ 10. 
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. 
200.  Patrick, ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684. 
201.  Id. ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 682. 
202.  See id. ¶¶ 6-8, 886 N.W.2d at 683. 
203.  Id. ¶ 8. 
204.  See id. ¶¶ 8-10, 886 N.W.2d at 683-84. 
205.  Id. ¶ 10, 886 N.W.2d at 684. 
206.  Patrick, ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 684. 
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CRIMINAL LAW – IMPLIED CONSENT AND SUSPENSION OF 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES 
Koehly v. Levi 
 
In Koehly v. Levi,207 Koehly appealed a district court judgment 
affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation (“DOT”) hearing 
officer’s order suspending his driving privileges for 180 days.208  Koehly 
argued that the implied consent law, as to breath tests, violated the state and 
federal constitutions, he cured his refusal, and the police officers violated 
his limited right to counsel.209  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed 
the judgment of the district court.210 
Koehly was cited for driving under the influence in July 2015.211  
While at the police station, Koehly was placed in a holding room.212  There, 
Koehly had his cell phone and proceeded to contact family and friends.213  
He made no attempt to contact an attorney.214  The arresting officer asked 
Koehly to consent to a breath test, which Koehly did not answer and 
eventually refused the breath test.215  Subsequently, Koehly requested a 
blood test instead of a breath test.216  The officer denied the request.217 
In August of 2015, the DOT held a hearing on whether Koehly’s 
license should be suspended for his refusal of a chemical test.218  The 
hearing officer found that Koehly refused the breath test.219  Koehly 
unsuccessfully petitioned the DOT for reconsideration.220  He appealed the 
agency’s findings to the district court.221  The district court affirmed the 
DOTs findings.  Additionally, the court concluded that the arresting officer 
did not violate Koehly’s right to counsel and the implied consent law 
 
207.  2016 ND 202, 886 N.W.2d 689. 
208.  Koehly, ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 690. 
209.  Id. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. ¶ 2. 
212.  Id. 
213.  Id. 
214.  Koehly, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 690. 
215.  Id. ¶ 3. 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id. 
218.  Id. ¶ 4. 
219.  Id. 
220.  Koehly, ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 691. 
221.  Id. 
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relating to breath tests was not unconstitutional.222  Koehly then appealed 
the district court judgment to the North Dakota Supreme Court.223 
Chapter 39-20 of the North Dakota Century Code (“N.D. Cent. Code”) 
governs North Dakota implied consent law.224  The chapter provides that 
the DOT may revoke the driving privileges of a person who refuses a breath 
test during a lawful arrest.225  The parties agreed that Koehly initially 
refused a breath test.226  Koehly, however, argued that he cured his earlier 
refusal by consenting to a breath test.227  The first issue, which the Court 
reviewed de novo, was whether North Dakota’s implied consent laws 
violated various federal and state constitutional provisions.228  The second 
issue was whether police officers violated Koehly’s limited right to counsel 
by placing him in a recorded and monitored room.229  Finally, the third 
issue was whether Koehly cured his earlier refusal to consent to the 
chemical test.230 
The Court rejected Koehly’s first argument that his revocation violated 
various provisions of the federal and state constitutions.231  Furthermore, 
North Dakota’s implied consent law regarding breath tests was recently 
upheld by the United States Supreme Court.232  In Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, the United States Supreme Court held that the U.S. Constitution 
permits breath tests as searches incident to lawful arrests for drunk 
driving.233  Likewise, Koehly’s second argument was also rejected.234  In 
Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner,235 the North Dakota Supreme Court 
held N.D. Cent. Code § 29-05-20 “entitles an arrested individual to have a 
reasonable opportunity to consult with an attorney before deciding to take a 
chemical test.”236  This statutory right is a “limited” right and “must be 
 
222.  Id. ¶ 5. 
223.  Id. 
224.  Id. ¶ 7. 
225.  Id. 
226.  Koehly, ¶ 7, 886 N.W.2d at 691. 
227.  Id. 
228.  Id. 
229.  Id. 
230.  Id. 
231.  Id. ¶ 9. 
232.  Koehly, ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 691 (citing Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 
2183-85 (2016)). 
233.  Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185. 
234.  Koehly, ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 692. 
235.  405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1987). 
236.  Id. 
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balanced against the need for an accurate and timely chemical test.”237  
Koehly argued police officers violated his limited right to counsel by 
placing him in a recorded and monitored room, which would have allowed 
officers to hear him speaking with his attorney.238  “Because Koehly made 
no attempt to call a lawyer, [the Court did not decide] whether the right to 
counsel would be violated by placing a person in a recorded and monitored 
room while the person speaks with a lawyer.”239 
The final issue the Court addressed was whether a person cures an 
earlier refusal of a chemical test by conditionally consenting.240  “Whether a 
person has cured an earlier refusal of a chemical test is determined by 
whether the person consented to the second request for a chemical test and 
whether the circumstances match the criteria outlined in Lund v. Hjelle:”241 
[W]e hold that where, as here, one who is arrested for driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor first refuses to 
submit to a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his 
blood and later changes his mind and requests a chemical blood 
test, the subsequent consent to take the test cures the prior first 
refusal when the request to take the test is made within a 
reasonable time after the prior first refusal; when such a test 
administered upon the subsequent consent would still be accurate; 
when testing equipment or facilities are still readily available; 
when honoring a request for a test, following a prior first refusal, 
will result in no substantial inconvenience or expense to the police; 
and when the individual requesting the test has been in police 
custody and under observation for the whole time since his 
arrest.242 
Additionally, the Administrative Agencies Practice Act,243 governs [the 
Court’s] review of an administrative decision to suspend or revoke a 
driver’s license.244  Under N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-49, the Court reviews 
an appeal from a district court judgment in an administrative appeal in the 
same manner as provided under N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-46, which 
 
237.  Koehly, ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 692 (citing City of Mandan v. Leno, 2000 ND 184, ¶ 9, 
618 N.W.2d 161, 163). 
238.  Id. 
239.  Id. ¶ 13. 
240.  Id. ¶ 14. 
241.  Id. 
242.  Id. (citing Lund v. Hjelle, 224 N.W.2d 552, 557 (N.D. 1974)); see also Maisey v. N.D. 
Dep’t of Transp., 2009 ND 191, ¶¶ 24-25, 775 N.W.2d 200, 208. 
243.  N.D. CENT. CODE. Ch. 28-32. 
244.  Koehly, ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d at 693 (citing Erickson v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 507 
N.W.2d 537, 539 (N.D. 1993)). 
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requires a district court to affirm an order of an administrative agency 
unless it finds any of the following: 
1. The order is not in accordance with the law.  
2. The order is in violation of the constitutional rights of the 
appellant.  
3. The provisions of this chapter have not been complied with in 
the proceedings before the agency.  
4. The rules or procedure of the agency have not afforded the 
appellant a fair hearing.  
5. The findings of fact made by the agency are not supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  
6. The conclusions of law and order of the agency are not 
supported by its findings of fact.  
7. The findings of fact made by the agency do not sufficiently 
address the evidence presented to the agency by the appellant.  
8. The conclusions of law and order of the agency do not 
sufficiently explain the agency’s rationale for not adopting any 
contrary recommendations by a hearing officer or an 
administrative law judge.245 
The Court does not make independent findings of fact or substitute its 
own judgment for that of the agency, but rather determines only whether a 
reasoning mind reasonably could have concluded the findings reached were 
supported by the weight of the evidence from the entire record.246  
Additionally, the Court in City of Bismarck v. Bullinger,247 said, “[a] 
conditional response to a request to submit to chemical testing can be 
interpreted either as consent or refusal, depending on the circumstances. 
The driver must suffer the consequences of an officer’s reasonable 
interpretation of the driver’s conditional response.”248 
In the present case, the Court found that a rational mind reasonably 
could have concluded Koehly did not cure his refusal.249  Moreover, the 
record showed Koehly did condition his offer to cure.250  “He stated he 
would take the breath test only if the officer stipulated in writing her refusal 
 
245.  Id. 
246.  Id. ¶ 16. 
247.  2010 ND 15, ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d 904, 907. 
248.  Id. 
249.  Koehly, ¶ 18, 886 N.W.2d at 694. 
250.  Id. 
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to allow him to take a blood test.”251  However, because Koehly did not 
unconditionally consent to the breath test, the Court held that a reasoning 
mind could have concluded he failed to consent to the test and therefore 
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FAMILY LAW—CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—CHILD CUSTODY 
Curtiss v. Curtiss 
 
In Curtiss v. Curtiss,253 Rebecca Curtiss (“Rebecca”) moved to the 
district court to suspend her former husband, Spencer Curtiss’s, (“Curtiss”) 
parenting time of their children while he was incarcerated.254  The district 
court granted Rebecca’s motion to modify Spencer’s parenting time and 
subsequently denied Spencer’s motion to reconsider.255  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court held the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings 
before modifying Spencer’s parenting time, and remanded the case to the 
trial court with instructions to make specific fact findings.256 
Spencer and Rebecca had two minor children and later divorced.257  
Spencer was awarded primary custody of the children by a district court in 
Kansas.258  Spencer moved to North Dakota in 2009, and Rebecca moved to 
North Dakota in 2010.259  In February 2011, Spencer was incarcerated at 
the North Dakota State Penitentiary and remains incarcerated.260  Following 
Spencer’s incarceration, Rebecca moved the North Dakota District Court to 
amend the divorce judgment to give her primary custody of the children.261  
Spencer agreed to give Rebecca primary custody, and the district court 
entered an Amended Judgment, which awarded Spencer supervised 
parenting time every other weekend at the state penitentiary.262 
In July 2015, Spencer moved the district court to enforce the Amended 
Judgment, arguing Rebecca was failing to bring the children to visit him at 
the state penitentiary.263  Rebecca then moved the district court to modify 
the Amended Judgment to suspend Spencer’s parenting time entirely while 
he was incarcerated.264  In support of her motion, Rebecca cited concerns 
that she and the children’s therapist believed visits to the state penitentiary 
were harmful to the children.265 
 
253.  2016 ND 197, 886 N.W.2d 565. 
254.  Curtiss, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 567. 
255.  Id. ¶ 1. 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. ¶ 2. 
258.  Id. 
259.  Id. 
260.  Curtiss, ¶ 2, 886 N.W.2d at 567. 
261.  Id. 
262.  Id. 
263.  Id. ¶ 4. 
264.  Id. 
265.  Id. 
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The district court scheduled a hearing to address the parties’ 
motions.266  The court allowed Spencer to participate in the hearing through 
the Interactive Video Network (“IVN”), but stated he was responsible for 
making the arrangements, noting the hearing would not be delayed if he 
failed to do so.267  Spencer failed to appear via IVN at the December 4, 
2015, hearing on the motions and the district court ruled in favor of 
Rebecca.268 
On December 22, 2015, the district court entered a third Amended 
Judgment ordering that the children are not required to visit Spencer while 
he was incarcerated, but if they wished to visit, a counselor or therapist 
must be present to supervise.269  The district court further ordered all 
communications of any kind between Spencer and the children to be 
supervised by a therapist.270  Spencer moved the district court to reconsider, 
and the district court denied the motion.271 
Spencer appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, arguing that (1) 
the district court did not have jurisdiction to amend the Kansas judgment; 
(2) the district court violated his constitutional rights by not issuing an order 
to the Department of Corrections demanding his appearance at the hearing; 
(3) the district court failed to make findings of fact that a material change in 
circumstances had been established to modify his parenting time; and (4) 
the district court erred by not scheduling a hearing and ruling on his 
motion.272 
First, the North Dakota Supreme Court found the district court had 
personal jurisdiction over Spencer under North Dakota Rules of Civil 
Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 4(b)(1).273  Spencer was incarcerated in 
Burleigh County and, at the time of the case, he had already submitted to 
the jurisdiction of the district court by moving to enforce the existing order 
establishing parenting time.274 
Second, the Court reasoned Spencer’s constitutional rights violation 
argument was akin to a procedural due process argument.275  Procedural 
 
266.  Curtiss, ¶ 4, 886 N.W.2d at 567. 
267.  Id. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. ¶ 5. 
270.  Id. 
271.  Id. 
272.  Curtiss, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d at 568. 
273.  N.D. R. CIV. P. § 4(b)(1) (2017) states: “[a] court of this state may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a person found within, domiciled in, organized under the laws of, or maintaining 
a principal place of business in, this state as to any claim for relief.” 
274.  Curtiss, ¶ 7, 886 N.W.2d at 568. 
275.  Id. ¶ 8. 
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due process requires fundamental fairness, which necessitates notice and a 
meaningful opportunity for a hearing.276  Under North Dakota’s 
jurisprudence, the right to appear at a hearing may be satisfied by 
appearance via telephone.277  Though, the district court did not have a duty 
to ensure Spencer’s presence at the hearing via telephone.278  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court found that the district court made clear to Spencer 
that it was his responsibility to arrange communication through the 
Department of Corrections.279  As such, the Court held the district court did 
not violate Spencer’s constitutional rights by holding the December 4, 
2015, meeting without him.280 
Third, Spencer argued the district court failed to make adequate fact 
findings that the modification of his parenting time was due to a material 
change in circumstances.281  Under North Dakota statutory law, the district 
court shall “grant such rights of parenting time as will enable the child to 
maintain a parent-child relationship that will be beneficial to the child, 
unless the court finds, after a hearing, that such rights of parenting time are 
likely to endanger the child’s physical or emotional health.”282  To modify 
parenting time, Rebecca was required to demonstrate a material change in 
circumstances had occurred since entry of the previous parenting time order 
requiring her to bring the children to the state penitentiary to visit 
Spencer.283  Parenting time for a parent without primary custody is 
presumed to be in the child’s best interest and should only be withheld 
when it is likely to endanger a child’s physical or emotional health.284  The 
Court noted a district court may not rely solely upon the child’s wishes 
regarding visitation285 and that the danger to a child’s physical or emotional 
health must be demonstrated in detail.286 
The Court found that the district court made no findings on the record 
as to whether a material change in circumstances occurred, whether 
suspended visitation is necessary to protect the children, and whether 
modification of custody of the children was necessary to serve the best 
 
276.  Id. (quoting St. Claire v. St. Claire, 2004 ND 39, ¶ 6, 675 N.W.2d 175, 177). 
277.  Id. at 569 (quoting St. Claire, ¶ 6, 675 N.W.2d at 175). 
278.  St. Claire, ¶ 6, 675 N.W.2d at 175. 
279.  Curtiss, ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 569. 
280.  Id. 
281.  Id. ¶ 10. 
282.  Id. ¶ 11 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-05-22.2 (2017)). 
283.  Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Prchal v. Prchal, 2011 ND 62, ¶ 11, 795 N.W.2d 693, 697). 
284.  Id. (citing Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 2000 ND 1, ¶ 21, 603 N.W.2d 896, 902). 
285.  Curtiss, ¶ 12, 886 N.W.2d at 570 (citing Votava v. Votava, 2015 ND 171, ¶ 15, 865 
N.W.2d 821, 825). 
286.  Id. (citing Hendrickson, ¶ 21, 603 N.W.2d at 896). 
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interests of the children.287  In its Order for Third Amended Judgment, the 
district court did not provide any explanation for the basis of its fact 
findings beyond stating “[h]aving heard the motion and supporting 
evidence, and having knowledge of the record in this matter . . .” before 
ruling that the children were no longer required to visit Spencer at the state 
penitentiary.288  The district court’s order denying Spencer’s motion to 
reconsider was similarly lacking in explanation,289 stating: 
The evidence in this matter was clear. The children of the parties 
are reluctant to visit their father in prison and have been working 
with a counselor concerning their relationship with their father.  
The order signed in December allows for contact by telephone call 
and letter if arranged through the counselor.  Rebecca Curtiss has 
been reasonable in her response to the wish of the children 
concerning parenting time. 
The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.290 
The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that the district court 
stating the children were reluctant to visit their father in prison and were 
working with a counselor was insufficient to constitute a showing of danger 
to the children’s physical or emotional health.291  Because of the district 
court’s failure to either make and/or record sufficient findings of fact on the 
record, the Court found the order amending custody was clearly erroneous 
under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a)292 and remanded the case to the district court with 
instructions to make specific findings.293 
The Court also noted the district court failed to make findings 
regarding its reasoning as to why supervised parenting time by a therapist 
was necessary to protect the children.294  Under Marquette v. Marquette,295 
“a restriction on visitation must be based on a preponderance of the 
evidence and be accompanied by a detailed demonstration of the physical or 
 
287.  Id. ¶ 13. 
288.  Id. (quoting the district court’s Order for Third Amended Judgment). 
289.  Id. 
290.  Id. (quoting the district court’s Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration). 
291.  Curtiss, ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 570-71. 
292.  N.D. R. CIV. P. § 52(a) (2017) states in relevant part: 
In an action tried on the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court must 
find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately. The findings and 
conclusions may be stated on the record after the close of the evidence or may appear 
in an opinion or a memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
293.  Curtiss, ¶ 13, 886 N.W.2d at 571. 
294.  Id. ¶ 14. 
295.  Marquette v. Marquette, 2006 ND 154, ¶ 9, 719 N.W.2d 321, 324. 
           
2017] NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW 523 
emotional harm likely to result from visitation.”296  Further, the district 
court record is unclear whether it considered each child separately or 
individually for either modification of custody or the necessity for 
professional supervision of parenting time.297 
Spencer’s final argument was that the district court erred by not 
holding a hearing on his motion to enforce the provision requiring the 
children to visit him while he was incarcerated.298  The record reflects that 
the hearing for Spencer’s motion was to be held at the same time as the 
hearing on Rebecca’s motion to amend custody to allow the children to 
discontinue visitation while he was incarcerated on December 4, 2015.299  
However, at that hearing, there was no mention of Spencer’s motion, nor 
was the district court’s order mentioned.300  Further confusing the issue, the 
judgment in favor of Rebecca’s motion to amend custody stated Spencer’s 
motion was resolved by the December 4, 2015, hearing.301  Spencer raised 
that issue in his motion for reconsideration, but the record but did not 
reflect the district court’s fact findings in support of its decision to deny 
reconsideration.302  The North Dakota Supreme Court declined to decide 
whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Spencer’s 
Motion to Reconsider because it had already determined to remand the case 















296.  Curtiss, ¶ 14, 886 N.W.2d at 571 (citing Marquette, ¶ 9, 719 N.W.2d at 321). 
297.  Id. 
298.  Id. 
299.  Id. 
300.  Id. 
301.  Id. 
302.  Curtiss, ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d at 571. 
303.  Id. ¶ 16. 
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FAMILY LAW – PRIMARY RESIDENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
CHILD – CHILD SUPPORT 
Hildebrand v. Stolz 
 
In Hildebrand v. Stolz,304 former girlfriend, Hildebrand, filed a 
complaint requesting the partition of real property, primary residential 
responsibility of child, and child support from former boyfriend, Stolz.305  
The district court granted Hildebrand primary residential responsibility of 
the children, ordered Stolz to pay child support, and partitioned real 
property.306  Stolz then moved to vacate the judgment, which was denied.307  
Stolz appealed.308  The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court’s finding that it did not abuse its discretion.  However, the judgment 
incorrectly stated the matter came before the district court “on motion” and 
“as a stipulated divorce action,” rather than as an action for partition of real 
property and for a determination of parental rights and responsibilities.309 
Hildebrand and Stolz were never married but had three children 
together.310  In Hildebrand’s complaint, she requested the partition of their 
real property, primary residential responsibility of their three children, and 
child support payments from Stolz.311  In Stolz’s answer, he denied that 
Hildebrand was the proper person to have primary residential responsibility 
and sole decision making responsibilities of their children.312 
A trial date was set for April 29, 2015.313  Prior to trial, Stolz’s attorney 
moved the court to allow her to withdrawal as counsel.314  Before the 
withdrawal, Stolz stated that all correspondence was to be forwarded to 
him.315  The motion to withdraw was granted on April 28, 2015, with the 
first day of trial to proceed on April 29, 2015.316  Stolz was not present; 
however, trial proceeded and the court heard testimony and received 
exhibits from Hildebrand.317  Hildebrand served the post-trial brief on Stoltz 
 
304.  2016 ND 225, 888 N.W.2d 197. 
305.  Id. ¶ 1, 888 N.W.2d at 199. 
306.  Id. 
307.  Id. 
308.  Id. 
309.  Id. 
310.  Stolz, ¶ 2, 888 N.W.2d at 199. 
311.  Id. 
312.  Id. 
313.  Id. ¶ 3. 
314.  Id. 
315.  Id. 
316.  Stolz, ¶ 4, 888 N.W.2d at 199. 
317.  Id. 
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on September 11, 2015, and on October 5, 2015, the district court issued its 
order.318  The district court found Stolz in default for failing to appear at the 
trial, awarded primary residential responsibility to Hildebrand, required 
Stolz to make $761 per month in child support payments, and ordered the 
partition of real property held jointly by Hildebrand and Stolz.319  Prior to 
the entry of judgement, Stolz hired a new attorney who filed a motion to 
vacate judgement on the grounds that Stolz was not aware of the trial date 
because his previous attorney never notified him of such date.320  
Hildebrand’s reply to Stolz motion contained an affidavit from their 
daughter stating that Stolz was aware of the trial date.321  “Relying on the 
affidavit from the parties’ daughter, the district court found it was “more 
likely than not that [Stolz] was aware of the April 29, 2015 trial date.”322  
Further, the court concluded that Stolz had an obligation to keep himself 
informed of his ongoing litigation.323  The district court denied Stolz’s 
motion to vacate and entered the judgment.324  Stolz appealed.325 
Stolz moved to vacate the district court’s memorandum and order 
under North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure (“N.D.R.Civ.P.”) 60(b), 
which provides that a party may only move for relief from a “final 
judgment or order.”326  The memorandum and order was not a final 
judgment.327  The district court, however, considered Stolz’s motion under 
N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).328  Because a consistent judgment was subsequently 
entered, the North Dakota Supreme Court considered Stolz’s arguments in 
the context of N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b).329 
Stolz’s argument on appeal is that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to vacate judgement.330  The standard of review for a district court’s 
determination on a motion to vacate is well settled: 
A motion to vacate lies with the “sound discretion of the trial 
court, and its decision whether to vacate the judgment will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless the court has abused its discretion.”  “A 
 
318.  Id. 
319.  Id. 
320.  Id. ¶ 5. 
321.  Id. at 200. 
322.  Stolz, ¶ 5, 888 N.W.2d at 200. 
323.  Id. 
324.  Id. 
325.  Id. 
326.  Id. ¶ 6. 
327.  Id. 
328.  Stolz, ¶ 6, 888 N.W.2d at 200. 
329.  Id. 
330.  Id. ¶ 7. 
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district court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable manner.”  “A trial court acts in an 
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner when its 
decision is not the product of a rational mental process by which 
the facts and law relied upon are stated and considered together for 
the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
determination.”  “An abuse of discretion also occurs when a 
district court misinterprets or misapplies the law.”  A self-
represented party should not be treated differently nor allowed any 
more or any less consideration than parties represented by 
counsel.331 
Stolz argued that the district court misapplied the law in entering the 
default judgment.  However, the North Dakota Supreme Court found that 
the district court found Stolz to be in “default” but did not enter and default 
judgment.332  None of the procedural requirements for a default judgment 
after an appearance had been made were requested or applied.333  Moreover, 
the district court heard testimony and took evidence.  Because this was not 
a default judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court declined Stolz’s 
request “to apply remedial considerations applicable to default 
judgments.”334 
Stolz next argued that the district court erred in granting his previous 
attorney’s motion to withdraw.335  He based his argument on the fact that 
the motion to withdraw was granted one day before trial and the district 
court did not check to see if Stolz was aware of trial before granting the 
motion.336  The Court was unable to find authority to support Stolz’s 
positon and did not overturn the district court’s decision granting the 
motion to withdraw.337  Additionally, the motion to withdraw complied 
with the North Dakota Rules of Court 11.2 and 3.2 and N.D.R.Civ.P. 
6(e)(1).338  Furthermore, Stolz consented to the withdrawal.339 
Stolz further argued that the district court erred in finding that he had 
notice of the trial date.340  The district court’s determination that Stolz knew 
 
331.  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
332.  Id. ¶ 8. 
333.  Id. 
334.  Stolz, ¶ 9, 888 N.W.2d at 201. 
335.  Id. ¶ 10. 
336.  Id. 
337.  Id. 
338.  Id. 
339.  Id. 
340.  Stolz, ¶ 11, 888 N.W.2d at 202. 
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of the trial date is a finding of fact, which the North Dakota Supreme Court 
will not set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.341 
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an 
erroneous view of the law, if no evidence exists to support it, or if 
the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite 
and firm conviction a mistake has been made. Under the clearly 
erroneous standard of review, we do not reweigh the evidence or 
reassess the credibility of witnesses[.]342 
Stolz based this argument on the fact that he never personally received 
notice of the trial date from the court, opposing counsel, or his attorney, and 
argued that “motions to vacate should be granted when the mistake or 
neglect is the fault of a third party.”343  The Court rejected this argument 
because Stolz failed to show that his failure to appear at the hearing was the 
mistake of his attorney.344  The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the 
lower court “considered the affidavits in evidence, and was not clearly 
erroneous by finding Stolz had notice of the trial date based on his 
daughter’s affidavit.”345  As a result, the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Stolz motion to vacate for mistake or excusable 
neglect under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1).346 
Next the court looked at N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6), which is a “catch-all” 
provision that allows a district court to grant relief from a judgment for ‘any 
other reason that justifies relief.’347  The Court rejected this argument as 
well, finding that in the district court’s order denying Stolz’s motion to 
vacate, “the district court stated ‘[e]ven if [Stolz] was not made aware by 
Ms. Nemec, he had an obligation as a self-represented party to apprise 
himself of the status of this litigation which has been ongoing since March 
2012.’”348  Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 






341.  Id. (citing N.D. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (2017)). 
342.  Id. (quoting Dronen v. Dronen, 2009 ND 70, ¶ 7, 764 N.W.2d 675, 681). 
343.  Id. ¶ 12. 
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ZONING AND PLANNING—MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
Dakota Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. City of Bismarck 
 
In Dakota Outdoor Advertising, LLC v. City of Bismarck,350 Dakota 
Outdoor Advertising, LLC (“Dakota”), appealed a district court order 
affirming the Bismarck Board of Commissioner’s (“Board”) decision 
affirming the Bismarck Planning and Zoning Commission’s 
(“Commission”) denial of an application for a special use permit.351  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding 
that (1) Dakota’s appeal from the district court order was not moot;352 and 
(2) the Commission’s decision to deny Dakota’s application for a special 
use permit was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.353 
Dakota entered into a lease with Boutrous Group (“Boutrous”), the 
owner of property in Bismarck, ND near the intersection of East Capitol 
Avenue and State Street, intending to erect a digital billboard on the 
property.354  The City of Bismarck’s Code of Ordinances (“Code”) required 
Dakota to obtain a special use permit before it could erect the billboard 
because it would be located less than 300 feet from a residential property.355  
Dakota and Boutrous applied for the special use permit to the Commission 
and met with city staff on December 10, 2014, to present studies regarding 
issues of whether digital billboards create an unreasonable risk of driver 
distraction.356  The Commission held a public hearing on the special use 
permit on January 28, 2015.357  At the hearing, Dakota testified about the 
studies it presented to the Commission, and a police officer testified about 
the frequent accidents at the intersection.358  The Commission then denied 
the application, by an eight-to-one vote.359 
Dakota and Boutrous appealed the Commission’s denial of the special 
use permit to the Board, and a hearing was held on the issue on March 24, 
2015.360  All parties were allowed to present evidence at the hearing, and 
the Board affirmed the Commission’s decision to deny the special use 
 
350.  2016 ND 210, 886 N.W.2d 670. 
351.  Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶ 1, 886 N.W.2d at 671. 
352.  Id. ¶ 9, 886 N.W.2d at 673. 
353.  Id. ¶ 15, 886 N.W.2d at 675. 
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permit on March 30, 2015.361  Dakota then appealed the Board’s and 
Commission’s decisions to the district court.362  The district court ordered 
the appeal be dismissed without prejudice after the parties stipulated to 
dismissal.363  Dakota and the Board presented briefs and a record, and the 
district court affirmed the Board’s decision and entered judgment on 
February 22, 2016.364 
Code ordinances regulating placement of digital billboards were 
changed since the district court entered judgment on the issue.365  The 
ordinance governing siting of digital billboards366 no longer includes a 
provision for obtaining a special use permit for a digital billboard at a 
distance of less than 300 feet.367  The current provisions governing digital 
billboards would not permit Dakota to obtain a special use permit for the 
proposed site.368 
The Board argues Dakota’s appeal to the Supreme Court is moot 
because the City of Bismarck no longer permits special use permits for 
digital billboards less than 300 feet from a residential area.369  At the time 
of Dakota’s application to the Commission, obtaining a special use permit 
would have allowed Dakota to erect the billboard at a distance of 150 feet 
from a residential area.370  By the time Dakota appealed to the Court, the 
150 feet exception had been repealed, and special use permits no longer 
afforded an exception to the 300 feet rule.371  The Board petitioned the 
Court to apply the current ordinance to the case, making it impossible to 
obtain a permit and thus rending its appeal moot.372  The Court declined to 
 
361.  Id. 
362.  Id. ¶ 5. 
363.  Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶5, 886 N.W.2d at 671-72. 
364.  Id. at 672. 
365.  Id. ¶ 6. 
366.  CITY OF BISMARCK, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-03-08(3)(b)(2) (2017) states in 
relevant part: “[a] site plan is submitted showing the overall dimensions of the sign, the location of 
the sign and any appurtenant features. The site plan shall be accompanied by a narrative 
description of operational elements of the sign including illumination and any electronic 
functions.” 
367.  Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d at 672. 
368.  Id. 
369.  Id. ¶ 7. 
370.  Id. (citing CITY OF BISMARCK, N.D., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4-04-12(5) (repealed 
Mar. 8, 2016) stating in relevant part: “[d]igital billboards must be located at least three hundred 
(300) feet from any [residential zoning district] . . . [t]his distance may be reduced to one hundred 
fifty (150) feet in accordance with the following provisions [if] . . . [a] special use permit is 
approved by the Planning and Zoning Commission in accordance with the provisions of Section 
14-03-08.”). 
371.  Dakota Outdoor Advertising, ¶ 6, 886 N.W.2d at 672; see CITY OF BISMARCK, N.D., 
CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-03-08 (2017). 
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do so, citing concerns about retroactively legislating a provision into the 
Code.373  The Code states that “[n]o part of this code is retroactive unless it 
is expressly declared to be so.”374  No provision of the current Code relating 
to digital billboards contains such a provision regarding retroactive 
application.375  Therefore, the Court held that Dakota’s appeal was not 
moot.376 
Dakota argued the Board’s decision to deny a special use permit was 
arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, contending the studies they 
presented to the Commission and Board supported a grant of the special use 
permit.377  Dakota further contends no evidence presented supported denial 
of the permit.378  The principle of separation of powers precludes the Court 
from re-deciding issues decided by a local government body379 and affords 
the Court a limited scope of review.380  The Board’s decision could only be 
overturned by a showing that it acted “arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unreasonably in reaching its decision.”381  The arbitrary, capricious, or 
unreasonable standard is defined as follows: 
A decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable if the 
exercise of discretion is the product of a rational mental process by 
which the facts and the law relied upon are considered together for 
the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable 
interpretation.382 
Dakota argued the Board failed to properly consider the studies it 
presented in support of approval of the special use permit.383  The Court 
stated that the Board was under no obligation to accept the studies and that 
Dakota carried the burden of convincing the Board to accept the studies it 
presented.384  The Board concluded the studies submitted were “at best, 
inconclusive” and failed to address the “cumulative effect of driving 
distractions.”385  The Board found the North Dakota Department of 
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Transportation’s report that the billboard was located at the seventh most 
dangerous intersection in the State of North Dakota and the second most 
dangerous intersection in the City of Bismarck more compelling than the 
studies submitted by Dakota.386 
The Court reasoned the Board reached a reasonable decision in 
weighing the evidence presented by both parties to conclude the intersection 
was too dangerous to allow a special use permit for a digital billboard 
nearby under the Code provision governing special use permits in 
residential zones which states “‘[t]he proposed use will not adversely affect 
the health and safety of the public and the workers and residents in the area’ 
before a special use permit can be approved.”387  The Court concluded the 
Board’s opinion that the digital billboard would pose a danger to the public 
was the product of a rational mental process in which the Commissioners 
exercised discretion.388  Accordingly, the Court held the Board’s decision to 
deny Dakota’s application for a special use permit to erect a digital 
billboard less than 300 feet from a residential neighborhood at a dangerous 
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